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∗
The central problems of Development Economics are the explana-
tion of the gross disparities in the global distribution, D, of eco-
nomic performance, E, and its persistence, P. Douglass North
argued, epigrammatically, that institutions, I, are the rules of the
game, meaning that I determines or at least constrains E. This
promised to explain D. 65, 000 citations later, the central problems
remain unsolved. North’s institutions, IN , are informal, slowly
changing cultural norms as well as roads, guilds, and formal leg-
islation that may change overnight. This definition, mixing the
static and the dynamic, is unsuited for use in a necessarily time-
dependent theory of developing economies. We offer here a suit-
ably precise definition of I, a dynamical theory of economic devel-
opment, a new measure of the economy, an explanation of P, a
bivariate model that explains half of D, and a critical reconsidera-
tion of North’s epigram.
Why do the haves have and the have-nots haven’t? This is one of the two cen-
tral questions of Development Economics and Economics History. The Nobelist
Douglass North opined in 1990 that, despite 40 years of immense effort, there had
been scant progress answering it (North, 1990). The lesser appreciated question
concerns the persistence of having. Though his monograph on the role of institu-
tions on economic performance through time was triumphal in tone and is now
the 14
th
most cited book in all the social sciences, we may say in 2019 that after
70 years of immense effort, progress on either question remains scant.
We present a theory of economic development that begins with a new transla-
tion of North’s narrative into mathematics. A theory of development must address
growth and loss, not only in the objective function, economic performance, but
in its source terms, in this case, institutions. A differential equations approach is
well-suited to this. We find that a 2-dimensional linear dynamical theory of De-
velopment Economics has verisimilitude, refines our understanding of institutions
and their role, and overturns convention. The task of answering why the haves
have demands more space than allotted here, but we show a two-factor model
that accounts for half of the global variance, and thus we half explain why the
haves have.
∗
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I. The Persistence of Fortune
The disparities in economic performance, E , are stark. Aggregating at the na-
tional level, per capita Gross National Income in 2017 (World Bank Data Group,
2017) ranged from about $128k in Qatar to $730 in Burundi, that is, by 175 ∶ 1.
Economic historians use the term “The Great Divergence” to encapsulate the
temporal growth of that range, and much research has been devoted to its ori-
gins. (Pomeranz, 2001) We ask instead, what may be said about the relative
economic fortunes of nations over the course of time, and what, if anything, does
that tell us about why the world’s haves have and why their having is persistent,
these being the two central and unsolved problems of Development Economics
and Economic History according to North. (North, 1990)
Let the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) serve as a proxy for E . Esco-
sura and co-workers (Prados de la Escosura, 2015) have estimated HDI for 164
countries at 24 dates covering the period 1870 to 2015, and a UN archive includes
annual data from 1990 to the present for 190 countries (UNHDR, 2019). We
denote the economic performance for a nation i in year t as E i(t) and the distri-
bution over all i as D(t) . Let the autocorrelation function of D between t and
t − τ be the persistence, Pt,τ . It is insensitive to temporal changes in scale, e.g.,
D(t) = f(τ)∗D(t−τ), while it remains sensitive to changes in relative position of
the E i arising from, e.g., stochastic rank order changes or a systematic nonlinear
expansion of the D universe.
As illustrated in Fig. 1 for all t and τ in the long term dataset, the persistence
erodes continuously, slowly, and independently of t, falling only 23% after 145
years. This suggests an approximation of the form
Pt,τ = (1 − δ)τ
where δ is the year-to-year loss in persistence. Employing all N = 486 unique
correlations among the two datasets, we estimate δ = 0.00135 ± 0.00045. We
may now answer our earlier question, “What may be said about the relative
economic fortunes of nations?” Specified in units such that D¯ = 0 and σ2D = 1, D
is materially constant over the course of a century. Its half-life is half a millennium.
II. A Dynamical Theory of Institutions and Economic Performance
In (1), North elaborated on his epigram, Institutions are the rules of the game.
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic, and social interaction. They consist of both infor-
mal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property rights).
Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings
to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with
the standard constraints of economics they define the choice set and
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Figure 1. Persistence in the global economy.
Note: P, the autocorrelation function of the distribution of indices of human development from 1870
to 2015 (Prados de la Escosura, 2015) shows slow, steady erosion. Lower inset: The distribution of
year-to-year erosions extracted from (Prados de la Escosura, 2015) and (UNHDR, 2019), implying that
the half-life of is approximately 500 years. Upper inset: Contemporary HDI is zero-centered unimodal.
therefore determine the transaction and production costs and hence
the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity. They
evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the future; history in
consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the
historical performance of economies can only be understood as a part
of a sequential story.”
Rules of the game is a play on words, marrying a colloquial meaning, how it is
done, with North’s avowed preference for game theory. But his persuasive prose
suggests differential equations, not game theory.
Robinson et al. (Robinson, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2001) were among the first
to codify North in mathematical terms. They wrote,
(1) E i = α × IiN + f(x⃗i)
where IN is some measure of institutions, α is a positive constant, and f is a
differentiable function over factors x⃗ that are broad enough in concept to include
what North called the standard constraints of economics, for instance climate,
geography, and natural resources. In all cases, the superscript i is the polity-level
index. Eq. 1 falls short if only because it lacks the one ingredient essential to any
theory of history or development, that is, time.
Later, Dell et al. (Dell, Jones and Olken, 2009) wrote
(2) E˙ i = α × IiN + f(x⃗i)
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If Eq. 1 states that institutions beget wealth, Eq. 2 states that institutions beget
economic growth. Inclusion of the time derivative is an improvement, but North
points out that IN and E evolve incrementally. Thus, we need a complementary
process, such as
(3) I˙iN = β × E i + g(x⃗i)
which encodes the widely acknowledged if overlooked fact that institutions are
expensive. The linear scale transformation IN →
√
β/α∗IN makes the coefficients
of IN and E identical, so without loss of generality, we may write β = α. That
coefficient, however we write it, couples IN and E but does not constrain them.
This is not merely a semantic point.
Eqs. 2 and 3 describe an unconstrained dynamical system. In the phase space
defined by IN and E , the system has a saddle point, an unstable fixed point,
shown in Fig. 2
Figure 2. Unstable Streamflows
Note: Streamlines of the unstable trajectory of a polity in a phase space governed by Eqs. 2 and 3.
Without loss of generality, we place the unstable fixed point at the origin. Wherever a polity begins its
journey, it is swept toward the positive sloping diagonal, the line I = E, and then accelerated away to
±∞ along that diagonal. Outcomes are extremely sensitive to initial conditions, as illustrated by the
red streamlines, dependent only on whether its initial position was above or below the negative sloping
diagonal, the line I = −E.
The streamlines of the flow drive a state toward the northeast-pointing diagonal,
thereupon ejecting it to ±∞ along that axis. The ejection proceeds exponentially
at a rate determined by the coupling, α. Consequently, a developed global econ-
omy would have exponentially rich states and exponentially poor ones and no
center. This would be reflected in a hollowing out of D. But D is zero-centered
and unimodal, as is seen in the distribution of 2017 HDI in Fig. 1, and persistently
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so. Thus Eqs. 2 and 3 are at best incomplete.
Furthermore, consider homophilous or like-states i and j such that x⃗
i ≃ x⃗j
for instance Arabian Gulf States, Scandinavia, or the Balkans. Like-states have
evolved together and E i≃Ej . Yet the solutions of Eqs. 2 and 3 may eject them to
opposite corners of the economic universe in Fig. 2, their fates determined only by
arbitrarily small differences in their initial conditions. Such homophilies are com-
mon, and a dynamical system that does not preserve them lacks verisimilitude.
Eqs. 2 and 3 disappoint on this condition, too. The system is too simple.
The premise of (Robinson, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2001), (Dell, Jones and
Olken, 2009), and others is that what North calls the standard constraints of
economics are realized in the exogenous factors. The solutions of Eqs. 2 and 3
demonstrate that this premise is false. An additional dissipative or drag term is
needed to constrain them, or equivalently, to stabilize the fixed point. Proceeding
accordingly, we get, in the most general case
E˙ i = −λ × E i + α × IiN + f(x⃗i)
I˙iN = α × E i − γ × IiN + g(x⃗i)(4)
Are the drag terms artifice or do they have economic meaning? Consider a state
that provides good health care and longevity to its inhabitants. In doing so, it
creates a cohort of too-old-to-work citizens who contribute little revenue to the
economy. The support of those by others is a drag on growth. This is hardly the
only such example.
Before we discuss the stability of this system, the meaning of its solutions, tests
of their validity, and its implications, let us first contemplate I˙iN . Per North,
IN are humanly devised informal constraints, e.g., taboos and codes of conduct,
and formal rules, e.g., constitutions and laws. IN is thus a composite, some of
whose elements change very slowly, e.g. taboos, and others much more quickly,
e.g. laws. We expose its composite nature by writing IN = I +N , where I are
the more rapidly varying elements, which we shall call Institutions, and N are the
more slowly varying elements, which we shall call Norms. It follows that I˙ ≫ N˙
and ˙IN = I˙ + N˙ ≃ I˙ . This result ripples through Eq. 4 leading to
E˙ i = −λ × E i + α × Ii + f(x⃗i,N i)
I˙i = α × E i − γ × Ii + g(x⃗i,N i)(5)
It must be apparent at this juncture that slowly varying Norms and rapidly
varying Institutions, though one and the same colloquially, have very different
influence on the ebbs, flows, and equilibria of our dynamical system and must be
conceived of and deployed as distinct types.
Eq. 5 is a system of first order linear differential equations whose exponential
solutions are well understood, but we will simplify them further. First, we redefine
the constants such that α → α/λ and γ → γ/λ. Second, we conjecture that the
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dissipation is more or less equal for both I and E . We will test this later, but for
now we set γ = 1, leaving
E˙ i = λ(−E i + α × Ii) + f(x⃗i,N i)
I˙i = λ(α × E i − Ii) + g(x⃗i,N i)(6)
The eigenvectors of Eq. 6 are the northeast- and southeast-pointing diagonals
µ = I + E and κ = I − E . The negative inverse of its eigenvalues are the time
constants of the exponentially converging solutions,
(7) τµ,κ =
1
λ
1
1 ∓ α
For 0 ≤ α < 1, both time constants are positive, and irrespective of its initial
condition, a state i flows to a fixed point φ
i
0. The flow is α-dependent, as may be
seen in Fig. 3. The relative dissipation strength, γ, which we have set to unity,
Figure 3. Streamlines of the stable trajectory governed by Eq. 6
Note: The α-dependent flow for α = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8. I is the ordinate and E the abscissa in each panel.
Irrespective of initial conditions, a polity flows to the system’s fixed point, φ0, shown here at the origin
without loss of generality.
determines the slope of the primary diagonal.
III. Are Institutions the Rules of the Game?
Consider the locus of fixed points, φ
i
0, in the coordinate system of the eigenvec-
tors, where f
i
denotes f(x⃗i,N i) and so forth.
(8) φ
i
0 = {µi0, κi0} = 1λ {f i + gi1 − α , f i − gi1 + α }
All that we have said thus far about x⃗ is that it is likely to be affected by climate,
geography, and natural resources. No doubt, the acute events of history, e.g., war
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and natural disaster, contribute, too. Climate and geography, like Norms, change
only over centuries. If these dominate f and g, then each fixed point is more or
less fixed over centuries, and this would explain the semi-millennial persistence of
D. Also, differentiability of f and g guarantees that the fixed points of like-states
are themselves close. Thus the dynamical system preserves homophilies, too.
Eq. 8 also informs us that φ
i
0 is determined by the coupling and the drag, and
by the arguments x⃗
i
and N i through the mediations of f and g, but not by the
Institutions. This arises from the structure of Eq. 6 whose bi-directional coupling
of I to E dictates that equilibrium lies in a corresponding phase space. Both I
and E are dependent variables, a finding that contradicts North’s epigram. As we
have split North’s IN into two pieces, is that contradiction a triviality of naming
conventions?
In 2016, developed countries provided $180B in foreign assistance to lesser
developed countries. Of this, at least $37B was committed to infrastructure,
governance, security, and building civil society (Development Initiatives, 2018),
that is, to I and not to N , with the expectation that these infusions from without,
Ix, would lead promptly to greater E . However, in as much as φi0 is dictated by
N , which is more or less constant because it is less malleable than I in general,
and particularly so from without, it follows from the dynamics that these Ix
induce an equal and opposite change in endogenous institutions, leaving the sum
unchanged, and E unchanged, too.
In other words, to effect a change ∆I, one must effect a change ∆N as dictated
by Eq. 8. Norms are, by definition, resistant to change. While it is not theo-
retically impossible to effect a ∆N , it is practically impossible on the short time
scale hoped for by those providing assistance. Finally, though assertions that ∆I
induce ∆N are not refutable, indirect inducement can be neither more prompt
nor more efficient than direct intervention.
Summarizing these ideas, North’s epigram deploys a definition of institutions
too broad for dynamical systems theory or for quantitative analysis. We parse
the definition, deploy it in the mechanism he lays out in the block quote opening
Section II, and find that the epigram does not hold. Without qualification, we
may say that Institutions, I, are not the rules of the game. Norms, N , and the
exogenous x⃗ determine the endgame.
IV. More Quantitative Tests
If the coupling of I to E is very strong, α ≃ 1 and τµ → ∞ per Eq. 7. We
invest in the judiciary to protect property rights and we invest in roads to facili-
tate commerce because we expect both to have an impact within years, perhaps
decades, possibly even generations, but not ∞. Therefore, α ≆ 1. On the other
hand, α≆0 because weakly coupled Institutions do not promote economic growth
and are of no concern here. We conjecture, then, that
α = O(0.5)
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For purposes of estimation we use α = 0.5.
The constraint λ is the drag on growth whose influence grows in concert with I
or E . It is the cost of doing business and of systemic waste. Its units are inverse
time. North estimates that more than 40% of spending in modern economies is
devoted to building and maintaining institutions, that is, to the cost of doing
business. We take λ = 0.2 as a working estimate. Eq. 7 then informs us that
the time constants for convergence to equilibrium are τµ = 10 and τκ = 3.3, both
measured in years, and both consistent with experience.
Let us now consider the functions f and g, both of which take the same argu-
ments. We assert that more or less the same considerations drive E˙ and I˙, and
therefore f ≃ g. From Eq. 8, it follows that on average κi0 ≪ µ
i
0, or
(9)
σ
2
µ0
σ2κ0
= (1 + α
1 − α)2
where the variances are taken over all states i. For α = 0.5, the ratio is 9, implying
that the equilibrium distribution should have a large principal component along
the µ = I + E axis, making µ the proper measure of Development Economics.
Given that the time constants are short compared to the centuries-long evo-
lution of the global economy, contemporary observations of the phase, φ
i
, must
be representative of φ
i
0, conditional upon noise in the form of war, civil war,
revolution, natural disaster, or isolation
1
, for instance. Testing Eq. 9, we esti-
mate σ
2
µ,κ using HDI as a proxy for E , and as a proxy for I we average five of
the World Bank’s six Worldwide Governance Indicators
2
(Kaufmann and Kraay,
2019)—Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality, Political Stability and Lack
of Violence, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability—to form a Worldwide
Governance Index, WGI. From annual datasets (UNHDR, 2019) and (Kaufmann
and Kraay, 2019), we compile 3210 joint observations on 189 countries between
1996 and 2016, shown in the upper left panel of Fig. 4. The ratio of variances is
8.2. Using Eq. 9, we infer α = 0.48, confirming our conjecture that α = O(0.5).
The correlation of I and E has long been taken as causation, but it is in fact a
predicted signature of the underlying dynamics.
As a final test of this theory, we ask whether it is possible to observe the phase
flow to φ
i
0 that is characteristic of the central panel of Fig. 3. We show, in Fig.
5, the 1996 to 2016 phase space trajectories of five states. Projecting these on
lines of slope ±1, the µ and κ axes respectively, we extract a time series (shown
as insets in the lower right and upper left in each panel) from which we estimate
the time constants, τ .
There is nothing privileged about this period of history. Most states will have
long-since gravitated toward their equilibria and their motion in phase space
1
Isolation limits the exchange of ideas and goods, both essential components of the global economy.
2
We exclude the sixth indicator, Government Effectiveness, because it is materially the same as HDI.
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Figure 4. Contemporary Institutions and Economic Performance.
Note: Upper Left: 3210 joint observations of WGI (ordinate) and HDI (abscissa) covering 1996 to 2016.
Colored groupings illuminate homophilies in Scandinavia (blue), the Arabian Gulf (red), the Balkans
(green), Central Asia (orange), and West Africa (purple). Upper Right: The same data, time-averaged
by state. Lower: The first principal component, µ = I+E, of the time-averaged data presented as a map.
will be stochastic, i.e. Sudan. We expect to see secular motion only in those
states caught up in multi-decadal economic or geopolitical trends, for instance
Rwanda and Syria. And, in those few that give evidence of relaxation toward
an equilibrium, we have no way of knowing whether the inferred equilibrium is
ephemeral.
That said, we fit τ for each and screen for p < 0.1, leaving us with 21 sound
estimates of τ
i
µ and τ
i
κ. Averaging, we get
τ¯µ = 10.5, σ = 7.5, N = 11
τ¯κ = 6.1, σ = 4.4, N = 10
These are consistent with Eq. 7 which tells us that τµ > τκ. From the ratio of
time-constants we infer α¯ = 0.26 and λ¯ = 0.13. Given the large variances of the
measured τµ and τκ, these inferences confirm our a priori estimates.
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Figure 5. Phase space trajectories of individual states.
Note: Bangladesh shows evidence of convergence along κ and South Korea along µ. Rwanda and Syria
are swept up in long term geopolitical trends, but are not in convergence. Sudan shows evidence of
having long since converged to its fixed point. The lower right panel presents the evidence for preferred
convergence along the main diagonal. The maximum count at θ ≃ 45◦ validates our equal dissipations
assumption The parabolic fit, p < 3∗10−11, illuminates the point.
These trajectories also provide us with an independent means to test the validity
of our choice of the special case γ = 1. If γ ≠ 1, then the preferred direction of
convergence is not along the µ direction or its conjugate, κ. Is there a more
preferred direction? Rather than project the trajectories along lines of slope ±1
to extract τµ,κ, we instead project them along lines of angle θ and θ + 90
◦
, tally
the number of sound estimates of τ , and then plot the sum as a function of angle.
The maximum of that sum, at or around θ = 45◦ in the lower right panel of Fig.
5 is consistent with the equal dissipations assumption γ = 1.
V. Summary
The large set of humanly devised systems that influence the economy contains
elements of two fundamentally different kinds. One, which we call Institutions, I,
varies on a time scale of the economy itself, and the other, which we call Norms,
N , varies much more slowly. Though convention groups these types together3,
3
One notable exception to this convention can be found in the work of Deirdre McCloskey. Equating
ethics and norms, she argues that mainly ethics, not mainly law—or what we would call Institutions—is
what holds societies together.(McCloskey, 2016)
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the dynamical theory embodied in Eq. 6 separates them because I˙ ≫ N˙ . The
theory makes several predictions, all of which are borne out. First, the long-term
persistence of the distribution of the economic performance of nations follows
because the loci of fixed points, φ
i
0, are set by slowly varying exogenous factors
and Norms. Second, the distribution of φ
i
0 is expected to have a large principal
component along the µ = I + E direction. Easily visible in the upper left panel of
Fig. 4, the measured value of ratio of variances is 8.2. Third, regarding the time
constants for convergence to φ
i
0, theory predicts τµ > τκ for 0 ≤ α < 1. Subject
to the assumptions λ = 0.2 and α = 0.5, the time constants are 10 and 3.3 years,
respectively. From the phase space trajectories of 186 nations over the period
1996 to 2016, most of which are noisy, we extract estimates, with large variances,
of τ¯µ = 10.5 and τ¯κ = 6.1. Both are comfortably close to the predicted values.
Finally, theory says that convergence in phase space proceeds along a preferred
direction determined by the ratio of the dissipation constants, γ. Testing all
directions, the lower right panel of Fig. 5 demonstrates that there is a preferred
direction that is consistent with our assumption γ = 1.
What then does theory tell us about Institutions and Norms? Institutions are
the humanly devised systems that promote growth in the economy and vary on
the same time scale as economic performance itself. The system equations tell
us something else, too. Institutional change keeps pace with the economy. A
specific rule, for instance property rights, is not an instance of I, because a rule
does not grow, though a book of rules might qualify. A specific rule, or respect
for rules might qualify as a Norm, though whether a specific cultural norm had
or has any effect on the fixed points is not something we can say without analysis
of materially all possible x⃗ and N . Now, consider the infrastructure to support
property rights, for instance a network of legislators, courts, and enforcement
bureaucracies, each with its buildings and professional staffs, each growing to
keep pace with an expanding E . This infrastructure is I. Generalizing, I is
infrastructure of the kind that supports economic growth. And like other forms
of infrastructure, it decays to inutility without (expensive) routine maintenance.
Norms, N , are the slowly changing codes of conduct, traditions, convention, and
taboos which bear, positively, negatively, or indifferently on E˙ and I˙. In the same
way that not all infrastructure bears on E˙ , neither do all Norms bear on E˙ or I˙.
For instance, the rules governing the permissibility of first cousin marriage are
Norms, but as to whether those exogamy conventions promote, retard, or remain
silent on E˙ or I˙, only quantitative analysis will tell.
The system eigenvectors µ and κ define new directions in phase space. Given
that σ
2
µ ≫ σ
2
κ, most of the system variance is along µ, but what is µ? It is the
total economy, the sum of the performance, that is E , and the infrastructure I
that supports its growth. In phase space, µ is the distance measured along the
main diagonal whose slope is +1. See the upper right panel of Fig. 4. If Norway
is an exemplar of social, economic, and political development, or simply order,
and Somalia is the opposite, then, µ measures Social Development or Fortune.
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Alternatively, −µ could be said to measure Social Entropy. No analogy is entirely
satisfactory.
Names aside, µ is the proper measure of Development Economics, and as such
must be the dependent variable in any modeling or prediction enterprise. The
thesis of the New Institutionalism (North, 1990), that institutions are the rules
of the game and, as such, are independent variables, must be put aside in favor
of the first term Eq. 8, which we simplify by exploiting persistence, absorbing
constants in f and g, and making the assignment f + g → f , leading to
(10) µ
i = f(x⃗i,N i)
In the language of causal inference (Pearl, 2009), this equilibrium solution of
the dynamical theory is a causal model and as such is the basis for forming
interventional and counterfactual queries on data (Pearl, 2018). The same may
not be said of ad hoc statistical models such as Eq. 1.
With the by-state data shown in the upper right panel of Fig. 4, we demonstrate
the potential of this µ-theory with a two-factor model, Eq. 11, while simultane-
ously acknowledging that small models are problematic. Half of the variance of
σ
2
µ is explained by T∗, an extremes-of-temperature variable capturing climate ad-
versity
4
(Climate Research Unit of East Anglia, 2018), and by mean elevation, h,
capturing geographic adversity.
(11) µ
i = −0.15 × T i∗ − 1.5 × h
i + f(x⃗i,N i)
N = 177 and the larger of the two p-values is 2 ∗ 10−12. The coefficient of T∗
corresponds to a 9.7% loss of gross national income per capita per
◦
C. The other
term corresponds to the same loss per 100 meters increase in mean elevation.
Both are probably overestimates owing to omitted variable bias, and in turn, their
contribution to the explained variance is probably overstated, too. Coefficients of
second order terms, e.g., T
2
∗ which might give evidence of an optimal temperature,
are indistinguishable from zero and are not shown.
Aristotle (Aristotle, 350 BCE) wrote of the effects of climate on politics and the
economy in the 4th century BCE. In the 14th-century, Ibn Khaldun (Ibn Khaldun,
1400) wrote more expansively on the subject, and Montesquieu (Montesquieu,
1748) went further yet in the 18th, each describing a mechanism and providing
data within the limits of his day. In 2009, Dell et al. (Dell, Jones and Olken,
2009) attributed a 9.5% loss of GDP per capita per
◦
C to adaptations not different
in spirit from those provided by earlier writers. On the basis of North’s epigram,
Robinson et al. (Robinson, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2001) formulate Eq. 1 and
argue that these observations about climate are spurious misassignments of cause
and effect. We do not exaggerate when we say that their work has been influential.
4
T∗ is country-averaged, mean monthly high temperature averaged over the interval 1900 to 2016.
An argument may be made that population-weighting is appropriate, though we do not employ it here.
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However, our analysis demonstrates that the epigram is ill-posed and that Eq. 1
is ad hoc. It is not causal and it is not a sound basis for causal queries or analysis.
Consequently, we reject their argument.
We turn, finally, to κ, the imbalance between I and E . Though κ is both
predicted and observed to be small, there is no a priori reason to expect it to be
zero. We may model κ using a corollary to Eq. 10, and though the dataset is
inherently noisier because κ is a difference between two large and independently
measured quantities, our bivariate model does attribute 4% of σ
2
κ to T∗ (p < 0.01)
and 0% to h.
A theory of Development Economics must account for growth and drag in the
economy and growth and drag on the sources of growth. We have presented here
the simplest of such theories and have shown that it predicts several features of
the global economy that were previously unexplained or misconstrued. Being the
simplest of such theories, much elaboration and many improvements are possible.
Among these, we note: (i) though Eq. 6 applies to one state i, we might couple
its development with other states j by introducing terms of the form cijEj and
similars for Ij , their time derivatives, and so forth; (ii) though we have treated
λ as a constant, we might introduce state-specific drag, λ
i
, such as would arise
from state-specific inefficiencies.
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